Pfc. Cecil F. Rogers


Dear Sir,

My name is GySgt. Randall Rogers currently stationed at the American Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand.  I just surfed through your web page and noticed that your roster of  Hill 881 warriors did not include my father.  His name is Cecil F. Rogers.  He was a PFC, MOS 0311 (rifleman), with India 3/26 and wounded on 19 January 1968.  He was wounded at the same time PFC. Leonard Lee Newton was killed.  My father was shot in the right arm by a AK-47 and hit with shrapnel from either a mortar or rocket which killed PFC.  Newton.  I have photos of him and PFC. Newton taken shortly before he was wounded which I will send to you.  He was medically evacuated and the Marine who called in the medevac helicopter was Glenn Prentice.

He left Vietnam and after his recovery went on to sea duty aboard the USS America as a Sgt. of the guard.

Several years ago when I was a Senior Drill Instructor at Parris Island, I had my dad down for graduation and I had him speak with my recruits.  It was the closest I have ever felt to my dad.  I heard him speak of things I have never heard him speak of.  It explained a lot of the things I experienced growing up and of his extreme love of the Corps.   He has always spoken highly of the Marine Corps and that is the principle reason that I joined.  His brother was also wounded in Vietnam and his father, my grandfather, served during W.W.II both as Marines.

I am very proud of him just as I hope he is of me.  The legacy of all who served at Khe Sanh will live on in the Corps as long as I am a part of it.

When I told my father of our contact and the fact that his old CO, Col. Dabney had emailed me, he was overcome with joy.

My father does not have access to the internet but I am sure he would like to hear from those who remember him.  His address is:

Cecil F. Rogers
281 Greens Creek Road
Robbinsville, NC 28771
Tel 828-479-2212

I would also appreciate any information you may be able to give me on that particular day's events and quite possibly put me in touch with anyone who may have served with my father.  His CO at the time was then Capt. Dabney.

Thank you and I look forward to hearing from you.  Also, if you or any other Khe Sanh Veterans are coming through Bangkok or Hanoi anytime in the near future, please let me know and I will make sure the Marines in those locations take care of you.

Sincerely,

Randall S. Rogers, GySgt. USMC

randyr100@hotmail.com


Gunny,

 You have asked for information about the events of that date.  As best I remember, they are as follows:

18 Jan - recon team operating vicinity 881N ambushed.  Several casualties, too many to be able to break contact.  Team asked for assistance.  India on 881S directed to attempt rescue, but without putting 881S at risk.  That meant I could only send one platoon.

India 3 sent out about noon to find/rescue team.  Platoon had patrolled area before, knew ground.  Because daylight was limited and platoon had to be back by dark, Platoon leader, Lt. Brindley, decided to shuck packs/flack jackets, make forced march over very rough ground.  Worked.  No contact on the way, found recon team on north slope of 881N, beat back NVA, evaced wounded, was back on 881S by dark.

That night, India was notified that recon team had abandoned radios/shackle sheets during firelight.  India was directed to send unit to ambush site and recover.  I tasked 1stPlt, Lt. Fromme, with mission.  Unwounded recon team member accompanied as guide.  IstPlt, using different route, moved off 881S about dawn, moved north carefully along finger coming south from 881N ridge line.  About halfway to objective, made point-to-point contact w/NVA platoon coming south.  Brief fire fight, 1stPlt went to ground, called in 81mm mortars to its front.

I suggested up the chain that I did not know size of force 1stPlt had hit, could not send reinforcing force without risking defense of 881S, and recommended that 1stPlt hose down area with mortars/arty, break contact and return to 881S.  Pointed out that recovery of radios/shackle sheets not worth risk of losing a platoon.  Permission granted, 1stPlt set up zone, evaced two casualties (1 KIA (Newton) plus your father), broke contact and returned to 881S, getting back just after dark.

We had been patrolling area around 881N daily for three weeks w/o contact until 18 Jan, so it was obvious from events of 18/19 Jan that NVA was moving in.  Requested permission to make recon-in-force next day towards 881N with all of India.  Bn, Regt agreed, Bn said they'd send Mike (-) up to hold 881S while we were gone.  Jumped off before dawn 20 Jan, made contact w/NVA Bn about 1000, fought all day, (7 KIA, 40 WIA friendlies, 107 NVA KIA (estimate - we caught them in the open at one point w/napalm from A-4s), returned to 881S at dark.  That night, NVA attacked 861, Khe Sanh Ville, Khe Sanh Base and probed Lang Vei.  Did not attack 881S, probably because our recon-in-force had found and fixed the attacking unit and arty/mortar fire had hurt it enough to slow it down.

For whatever it's worth, 881S was furthest unit out during siege, yet it was the only position not assaulted by NVA.  I still believe that events of 18 through 20 Jan were enough to screw up NVA unit designated to attack us, and thereafter, we had so much firepower available that we hosed down everything, sometimes because of indications, more often just for the hell of it.  When I say hosed down, I mean lots of fire - 2-300 rounds of 60mm/81mm mortars, about the same amount of mixed PD and VT fuse arty, plus CAS during daylight and Puff gunships at night would be a typical day's worth.  We kept the Air Metal Density Index as high as we could, and it paid off.  When visibility was 0/0, which was often, we'd hose down randomly around hill w/arty/mortars, and around 0200, every man in trenches (about 200) would, on signal, heavy a grenade as far as he could.  Brushed them back and kept them honest.

Hope that gives you some feel for what your father's service was like.  Remember that all this was happening during Tet '68, when all of 'Nam was at general quarters, so there were simply no forces available for 26th Marines at Khe Sanh to go on the offensive.  It wouldn't have worked anyway, because we were only about 10 clicks from the Laotian border, which meant that NVA had sanctuary (all their heavy arty was based in Laos).

Be happy to answer any questions.  Assume you'll pass this on to your dad.  Please give him my best regards.  Godspeed and Semper Fidelis.  Dabney.  Out.

indiasix

Prelude to the Siege of Khe Sanh

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